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This article argues for epistemic decolonization by develop-
ing a relational model of knowledge, which we locate within 
indigenous knowledges. We live in a time of ongoing global, 
epistemic coloniality, embedded in and shaped by colonial 
ideas and practices. Epistemological decolonization requires 
taking nondominant knowledges and their epistemes seri-
ously to open up the possibility of interrogating and disman-
tling the hegemony of the Western knowledge tradition. We 
here ask two related questions: What are the decolonial affor-
dances of indigenous knowledges? And how do these com-
pare to other contemporary critiques of epistemic coloniality, 
specifically those mounted by posthumanism? In answer, we 
develop three definitional senses of relational with reference 
to indigenous knowledges. First, we define indigenous knowl-
edges in relation to Western knowledge, with which they 
share a dialectical origin at the moment of colonial contact. 
Second, indigenous knowledges are relational in their onto-
logical and axiological orientations. Third, relationality in 
indigenous knowledge suggests a trialectic space, rather than 
a dialectic space. We argue for the necessity of an anticolonial 
framework, which assigns priority to indigenous people’s 
perceptions and ways of knowing for theorizing recurring 
colonial relations and their (imperialistic) manifestations in 



















































We argue here for epistemic decolonization by developing a relational 
model of knowledge, which we locate within indigenous knowledges. Our 
underlying assumption rests on Ramón Grosfoguel’s claim about coloniza-
tion, that the “heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place 
over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political 
decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years” (2011, 14). Thus, 
we live in a time of ongoing global, epistemic coloniality, embedded in, and 
shaped by, colonial ideas and practices. Epistemological decolonization1 
requires being attentive to, and taking seriously, nondominant knowledges 
and their epistemes, so as to open up the possibility of interrogating and 
dismantling the hegemony of the Western knowledge tradition. A central 
internal tension within the decolonial project is revealed in the state-
ment that epistemic decolonization involves interrogating “the history 
and logic of those processes that allowed the Western episteme to erase or 
conceal the contextual and temporal dimensions of its own origin so that 
it could present itself as acontextual, ahistorical and universal” (Praeg 
2019, 1). This phrasing raises the question of the location from which such 
interrogation can be carried out. The failure to mention other knowledge 
traditions suggests that adopting an attitude of epistemic skepticism from 
within the Western tradition is sufficient. An opposite approach asks 
whether humanist thinking can be disentangled from its linkages with 
coloniality (Zembylas 2018). To paraphrase Audre Lorde (2003), we have to 
ask whether we can use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house. 
In this article, we consider two related questions: What are the decolonial 
affordances of indigenous knowledges? And how do these compare to 
other contemporary critiques of epistemic coloniality, specifically those 
mounted by posthumanism? We argue for the necessity of an anticolonial 
framework that “theorizes colonial and re-colonial relations and the impli-
cations of imperial structures on the processes of knowledge production 
and validation” (Sefa Dei 2002, 39, 43) by giving priority to the perceptions 
and ways of knowing of indigenous peoples and mobilizing these for inter-
rogating their marginalization.
Considering the decolonizing potential of indigenous knowledges, 
we must think through the relations between what have come to be 
broadly termed Western knowledges and indigenous knowledges as a 
meeting of differing ways of producing, reproducing, and representing 
ideas. We define indigenous knowledges as fundamentally relational in 
three senses that are distinct but necessary to the anticolonial potential 
these knowledges hold for decolonization. First, indigenous knowledges 
must be considered relational to Western knowledges because, as catego-
ries of knowledge, they share a dialectical origin at the moment of colonial 
contact, when indigenous knowledges were instantiated within the colo-
nial regime of power as subjugated and Western knowledges as superior. 


































the ongoing contestation of this power imbalance, the righting of which 
is the urgent work of decolonization.
Second, we contrast indigenous knowledges with hegemonic Western 
epistemology in terms of their ontological and axiological orientations. We 
draw on discussions of indigenous knowledges as fundamentally relational, 
in the sense that they prioritize the role of the relationships among actors, 
artifacts, and spaces in the construction of knowledge. This networked 
relational knowledge-making model establishes and nurtures connections 
among individuals, communities, abstract and concrete tools, and so forth 
that make up knowledge-producing communities. This relationality is spiri-
tual in nature because it is rooted in an ontology recognizing the spiritual 
realm as real and integral to knowledge making while it guides axiological 
assumptions of why and how knowledge should be made, held, and applied. 
As we discuss in detail, this relational epistemology is radically inimical 
to the Western rationalist epistemology that has its roots in seventeenth-
century Enlightenment humanism. By positing the knowing subject as 
the Cartesian cogito, and a specific kind of rational logic as the marker of 
the human, the humanist tradition severs knowledge from the temporally 
embodied context of the knower and subalterns humans of other epistemic 
traditions as well as nonhuman others. The humanist subject is thus, as 
Karin Murris puts it, “the ‘I’ that has made modernity and colonialism 
possible” (2017, 458). Additionally, rationalist understandings of history, 
epitomized in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s notion of world history, 
which posits historical development as the result of the logical reconcili-
ation of contradiction, locate history in the realm of the ideal and work to 
obscure the real historical violence by which cultures gain and reproduce 
power. This rationalist bias is present, we argue, in the notion of a dialectic, 
which focuses on universally discursive space at the cost of an embodied, 
situated context.
These considerations bring us to the third sense, in which indigenous 
knowledge insists on relationality, its locating of knowledge in suahunu, a 
“trialectic space” of body-mind-soul or culture-society-nature, rather than 
the logical dialectic (Sefa Dei 2012). By insisting on knowledge as rooted in 
a specific location and in the embodied history of dwelling in that place, 
indigenous knowledges cannot conceive of universals; rather, knowledge 
must be understood as “multiple” (Sefa Dei 2000) or “pluriversal” (Mignolo 
2002) and diverse pathways acknowledged for realizing the practicalities 
of its production (Zembylas 2018). To illustrate this sense of relationality 
further, we briefly discuss recent posthumanist ideas, which share with 
decolonial thinking a rejection of the modern, humanist “I.” Yet, as we show, 
by failing to interrogate the “geo-political embeddedness of knowledge” 
(Zembylas 2018, 264), by moving too quickly from the humanist concepts 
these posthumanist ideas reject to embracing these concepts’ logical oppo-
sites (as implied in the term posthumanist), posthumanist approaches fail to 
escape the boundaries of Hegel’s notion of history as limited to the realm of 


















































colonial centers, and paradoxically draws power from the hegemonic status 
of the humanist tradition it rejects, will against its best intentions work to 
absorb indigenous knowledges into a new universalism. That is the advan-
tage, we contend, of George J. Sefa Dei’s anticolonial approach, which looks 
to non-Western epistemes, new languages, and new embodied and localized 
metaphors with which to do the work of “reimagining present-futures” 
(Desai and Nyandiko Sanya 2016, 712, quoted in Zembylas 2018, 258). We 
argue for an understanding of relationality grounded in non-Western tradi-
tions, which requires Western knowledges to accept a lesser place as one 
epistemology among many.
By mobilizing the idea of relational knowledge to guide an anticolo-
nial critique, we arrive at a counterhegemonic knowledge-making model. 
The three senses in which knowledge is relational thus work together, locat-
ing knowledge making in local relations among actors, artifacts, and places 
and so in local identities forged by histories and negotiations of power. 
By shaping these relationships, we can systematically pursue an agenda 
of epistemological diversification. We note, however, that the strategy of 
decolonizing from within indigenous locations and drawing from those 
histories and resources raises the problem of inappropriate appropriation, 
especially in light of the fact that none of us as authors would be considered 
indigenous persons.
Defining Indigenous Knowledges as Relational
We are aware that a number of pitfalls are associated with attempting to 
define indigenous knowledge, including the possibility of applying “the 
colonial paradigm” (Shahjahan 2005) of categories and reifying it according 
to narrow and simplistic criteria or, as we discuss in more detail below, 
the tendency by hegemonic interests to appropriate it for political and 
economic gain (Sundar 2002). Nevertheless, because the phrase indigenous 
knowledge is in widespread use, we believe that attempting a definition 
is necessary as an initial step, laying bare the political and conceptual 
foundations of the term. Defining indigenous knowledge as a conceptual 
category requires emphasizing the distinction between indigenous and 
Western knowledge communities and their knowledges and the respective 
positions that these communities hold, particularly within knowledge-
making spaces. In other words, epistemological systems cannot be defined 
without acknowledging and engaging with what Michalinos Zembylas 
calls the “geo-political embeddedness of knowledge” (2018, 264). Our 
definition therefore seeks to acknowledge indigenous knowledge’s entan-
glement with colonial categories as “other” to Western knowledges and 
simultaneously describe its unique epistemological positions, which, we 



































three Senses of Relational
As set out in the introduction, we define indigenous knowledges as relational 
in at least three complementary senses. First, these knowledges, constitut-
ing a separate “other” category, have a dialectical origin alongside Western 
knowledge in the moment of colonial contact. This contact established an 
unequal relationship of power between knowledges, creating indigenous 
knowledges as subjugated knowledges. Second, indigenous epistemologies 
understand knowledge as fundamentally relational, existing among place, 
person, nature, and spirit, resulting in an understanding of the human 
that differs from that of the Enlightenment cogito. Third, the commit-
ment of indigenous epistemologies to embodied location and relational 
practice implies that knowledge can never be universal, but must rather be 
pluriversal.
relation as Dialectic
Our initial positioning of indigenous knowledges emphasizes their existence 
in dialectical opposition with Western knowledge. Here, the meaning of the 
term indigenous, as Anders Breidlid and Louis Botha argue, implies, for cer-
tain societies, a subjugated status, which “originates with and is perpetuated 
by their contact with a modern Western system of social organisation” (2015, 
321). In this understanding, indigenous knowledges exist as a result of his-
torical relations, which, from the moment of colonial contact, establish an 
antagonistic dialectic relation (since colonial contact produces domination 
and subjugation) between indigenous knowledges and Western hegemonic 
knowledge. The defining criterion for this conceptualization of different 
indigenous knowledge systems is therefore located within the context of a 
shared experience of domination. The content, explanations, and values of 
indigenous epistemologies preexisted colonial contact; however, their nature 
as subjugated knowledges, and the ontological status of their holders as infe-
rior or nonhuman, was generated in the moment of contact with hegemonic 
Western epistemology. In this understanding, indigenous knowledge emerges 
and is recognized as a counterpoint and site of resistance to the dominance 
of encroaching Western, colonial epistemes.
Above, we noted a risk associated with applying colonial paradigms 
to define indigeneity. Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues vehemently against 
the category of indigenous, arguing that “research and theorizing about 
the multiplicity and specificity of indigeneity ends up producing cultural 
difference as an a priori and renders invisible racialized knowledges that 
continue to define us. In this way cultural difference is compelled to func-
tion discursively to re-inscribe race” (2016, 115). She holds that it is impos-
sible to “transcend liberal universal thought without first dismantling and 
destroying racialized knowledge” (2016, 115). We are attentive to this warn-


















































uniqueness, and their differences from Western hegemonic knowledge, that 
their epistemological and moral authority can be manifested and acknowl-
edged as equal to, not subjugated by, Western knowledges. In this way racial-
ized categories placing Western knowledge above indigenous knowledges are 
destroyed. Also, we hold that the idea of indigenous as appearing in opposi-
tion to Western hegemonic knowledge is still vital to maintain, so that the 
urgent and unfinished political work of decolonization is less easy to ignore. 
Recognizing the indigenous as dialectical other to Western knowledge claims 
opens discursive space in which alternate, long-silenced epistemological 
positions and tools can appear.
relational as Ontological space
Indigenous knowledges cannot be reduced to their opposition to Western 
knowledge. They mount a serious challenge to humanist assumptions by 
offering radically different ontological and epistemological principles. Before 
setting out their central positions, we therefore give a necessarily brief 
account of characterizing arguments of Western hegemonic epistemology.
Like Lesley Le Grange (2004) and Breidlid (2013), we use the term 
Western to identify tentatively a dominating Eurocentric way of knowing 
that has its origins in the seventeenth-century Enlightenment. Its features 
are perhaps most clearly visible in the Cartesian-Newtonian version of 
science, with its characteristically mechanistic view of reality, true/false 
dichotomies, and aspirations of objectivity (Morgan 2003). Such a science 
aspires to universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism, driven 
not only by a methodological rationale, but also by the belief that the 
Western scientific way is right and good (Merton 1973). Two core dynamics 
of Enlightenment epistemology are evident here: first, the humanist assump-
tion that rationality is the singular human ability; second, a tendency to 
hierarchize and dominate. These dynamics are intertwined.
In Enlightenment thinking, the “nature and destiny of the human 
being” is to achieve “rational autonomy,” with rationality taken to be the 
“marker of what it means to be human” (Biesta 2006, 4). This legacy is 
grounded in the work of Immanuel Kant, who argues that Enlightenment “is 
the human being’s emancipation from its self-incurred immaturity” (2006, 
17). This position is affirmed in the work of René Descartes, whose famous 
dictum, “Cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am)” ([1637] 2003), shapes the 
emergence of Western modern subjectivity. Modern subjects are defined by 
what they can know with absolute certainty through reason, and thus, neces-
sarily, what is open to doubt. Hence, what the cogito (the rational, thinking 
subject) can know creates an important epistemological orientation, which, 
in turn, gives rise to various ontological dispositions, such as skepticism, 
subject/object dualism, and the central reliance on rationality to determine 
truth. These ontological assumptions shape what counts as knowledge, 
as well as whose knowledge counts. One important materialistic expres-


































advocates for a purely empirical approach to social reality to determine the 
laws that govern it ([1848] 2009). It constructs knowledge as a hierarchy and 
restricts its attainment, with humanist rationality the gatekeeper to episte-
mological access. At the same time, it characterizes other knowledges (for 
example, magical or religious thinking), or the epistemes of unenlightened 
societies, as being of limited local relevance and scope, relativist, irrational, 
and so forth. Implied in this construction is a right to hegemonic status for 
“true rational” knowledge.
Perhaps the most influential account of the functioning of rationality 
in the humanist tradition is Hegel’s dialectical method, which essentially 
aims to account for the logical evolutionary development of a concept and, 
for Hegel, history itself ([1817] 1991, [1807] 2013). It begins with a stable, 
fixed concept, called the thesis; for example, “Being.” The existence of this 
concept necessarily gives rise to dialectical movement, called the “nega-
tively rational” (Hegel [1817] 1991, sec. 79; Maybee 2016). What emerges in 
this moment of instability is that the thesis passes into its opposite, giving 
rise to the antithesis, in our example, “Nothing.” Hegel calls this movement 
“self-sublation” ([1817] 1991, sec. 81). The third moment of the dialectic is 
the synthesis, called the “positively rational” moment (Hegel 1991, secs. 
79, 82). This moment “grasps the unity of the opposition between the first 
two determinations [and] is the positive result of the dissolution or transi-
tion of those determinations” (Maybee 2016). In our example, the synthesis 
would be the emergence of “Becoming,” through the sublation of Being and 
Nothing. Thus, for Hegel, to sublate (in the German, aufheben) has a double 
meaning, implying both to cancel (or negate) and to preserve:
The moment of understanding sublates itself because its 
own character or nature—its one-sidedness or restricted-
ness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its 
opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of 
self-sublation, or a process in which the determination from 
the moment of understanding sublates itself, or both cancels 
and preserves itself, as it pushes on to or passes into its oppo-
site. (Maybee 2016)
The dialectical process unfolds continually through history, leading to 
increasing comprehensiveness and universality. The synthesis self-sublates, 
creating a new antithesis; thus, in turn, a new synthesis emerges, and the 
process continues in an evolutionary and teleological fashion, moving 
toward what Hegel calls the “Absolute” ([1807] 2013, 11). In his philoso-
phy of world history, Hegel defines history in rational terms: history is the 
rational pursuit of freedom, and non-European civilizations are unhistorical 
because they are not conscious of freedom, of the capacity for self-determi-
nation that resides in every human’s rationality. Therefore, individuals in 
these civilizations are not motivated to work for their own freedom. They 


















































to European civilization, happens when “a given level of consciousness of 
freedom being attained and embodied in social life, that level of conscious-
ness harbors some inner ‘contradiction’ or tension which propels people, 
qua rational beings, to bring about change and improvement” (Stone 2017, 
13). Historical development is thus a rational response to contradiction—
the dialectic between thesis and antithesis, giving rise to sublation. That is 
why the “Absolute” is both logical and historical, the final “completely all 
encompassing” moment (Maybee 2016), which Francis Fukuyama famously 
termed “the end of history” (1992, ix). The dialectical process occurs across 
all levels of reality to reach its full, eventual completeness. What underpins 
this movement is Geist (Spirit) another central term in Hegel’s work. Geist 
is a “sort of general consciousness, a single ‘mind’ common to all men” 
(Solomon 1970, 642). Geist is not a thing, but, like Descartes’ cogito, a ratio-
nal activity, which shapes and directs reality. It “is simply the underlying 
unifying principle of consciousness and, at the same time, the underlying 
rational will ‘behind’ all practical reason and action” (Hegel [1807] 2013, 
sec. 440; Solomon 1970, 660).
Such a dialectical understanding of ideal history is an illuminating 
example of the all-encompassing Enlightenment narrative, which finds sup-
port in progressive scientific and political endeavors in Western Europe, but 
is used to justify colonization in the name of this Eurocentric humanism 
itself. Kant and Hegel, for example, both express racist stereotypes about the 
nature of precolonial societies (See, e.g., Kleingeld 2007; Kuykendall 1993; 
Moellendorf 1992). Hegel writes that Africa “has no historical interest of 
its own, for we find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery in a 
land which has not furnished them with any integral ingredient of culture” 
([1837] 1992, 174). The underlying teleological assumption of the dialectical 
method implies the inevitability of the triumph of Western knowledge over 
all other systems of knowledge.
The universalizing potential within Western epistemology was pro-
gressively confirmed and heightened by the ongoing process of colonization.2 
With “conquest, world trade, colonialism, and development, . . . what the 
West exported, and continues to export world-wide, is a particular form of 
rationality which is dominant today” (Apffel-Marglin [1996] 2011, 34). The 
manner in which this dominating tendency is coupled with Western colo-
nialism to produce dominant and subjugated knowledges is highlighted by 
Breidlid:
It is one of the characteristic traits of colonialism that it denied 
diversity, epistemic diversity, and created instead inferiority. 
The production of the hegemonic epistemology necessitated 
the Other, which is characterized as uncivilized, irrational, 
superstitious. (2013, 7)
Under the political and economic conditions of colonialism, a European 


































was transformed into a globalized, dominant epistemology with universal-
izing claims:
Knowledge constructed by modernity and Eurocentrism (since 
the Renaissance) is native or indigenous European knowledge 
(yes, Europeans are indigenous peoples too; they do not come 
from the moon), which became universal through the demand-
ing [of] support in economic matters by capitalism and its 
expansionist political project of the neoliberal nation-state. 
(Mignolo 2013, 7)
In the neoliberal climate, we speak of the “global knowledge economy,” a 
euphemism for the way in which advanced, first-world economies more or 
less determine the economic and political fate of other countries by allowing 
or withholding access to material and social resources. In epistemic terms, 
humanism and its central value of rationality still overwhelmingly shape 
how we determine the meaning of humanity and the accompanying subjuga-
tion of other ontologies and epistemes. It is against this epistemology that, 
we contend, indigenous knowledges assert themselves as relational.
This second meaning of relational is the idea that knowledge is 
strongly related to local context and practices: “indigenous knowledge . . . 
may be defined as the cumulative body of strategies, practices, techniques, 
tools, intellectual resources, explanations, beliefs, and values accumulated 
over time in a particular locality without the interference and impositions of 
external hegemonic forces” (Emeagwali 2013, 31). This interpretation posits 
that indigenous knowledges originated in a time before colonial invasions. 
The deep and independently established ontological roots of indigenous 
people’s knowledges form the basis of the often unique epistemological and 
axiological assumptions that govern their epistemic traditions and differenti-
ate those from the dominant Western ones dispersed by colonial invasions. 
Such an understanding is valuable in that it offers descriptors of indigenous 
knowledges independent of their relationship with their Western hege-
monic Other. Now the focus is instead on the relationships established by 
ontological space, “innate intuitive ways of knowing associated with long-
term dwelling within particular historical spaces” (Sefa Dei 2012, 824). The 
association of indigenous knowledges with a specific location seems often 
to be misconstrued as implying that it is about local phenomena, whereas 
we believe it should be read as indicating knowledge that is characterized 
by strong relationships with local phenomena. The relational principles 
that indigenous epistemologies share speak to the ways in which histories 
become inscribed in the tools and practices of a community, becoming fit for 
the specific social and material contexts within which they were developed. 
These definitions focus on the relational epistemological principles by which 
indigenous knowledges operate, more so than their content or purview. The 
local relational aspect of indigenous knowledges is thus based within a per-


















































Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not 
colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a par-
ticular place—indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/
their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, 
ontologies, and cosmologies. (Tuck and Yang 2012, 6) 
This fundamental relational principle, in terms of which knowing is con-
structed within the relationships between indigenous people and their 
surroundings, implies a second orientation, profoundly different from the 
Western hegemonic tradition, which holds that these relationships become 
“the spiritual link that binds the individual to content, process and pro-
tocol” (Fatnowna and Pickett 2002, 214). This observation, which comes 
from work in Aboriginal Australian communities, implies the associa-
tions that indigenous people and their knowledges have with their locality 
are premised on a spiritual access that mediates knowledge about, with, 
and for their environment and realms beyond them. Explanations of how 
indigenous knowledges proceed from an understanding of spiritually based 
reality are abundant (Chilisa 2012; Kovach 2009; Sefa Dei 2002), and they 
speak to the epistemological and axiological implications of this world-
view: “Spirituality in an Aboriginal sense is encompassing and holistic 
in nature. It is the starting point that requires no demonstration of proof; 
it exists and all truths begin and end there” (Fatnowna and Pickett 2002, 
214). Indigenous epistemologies are premised not only on investigations of 
the world observable to humans, but also on interactions with a spiritual 
realm. This contrasts with Western epistemologies, which limit them-
selves strictly to knowledge about, and separate ethical considerations 
into a different category of thought, and in which “anything non-material, 
unseen, and thus immeasurable in this [scientific] epistemological frame-
work [is] considered invalid and ‘unreal’ and dismissed as invalid knowl-
edge” (McDonnell 2014, 104).
The central relational principles of indigenous knowledge therefore 
have profound ontological and ethical consequences that are inimical to 
hegemonic rationality and to global capitalist assumptions. Regarding 
this, we draw from Riyad Ahmed Shahjahan, who calls spirituality “a way 
of being in the world where one is connected to one’s cultural knowledge 
and/or other beings (e.g., one’s community, transcendental beings, and 
other parts of creation) and allows one to move from inward to outward 
action” (2009, 122). This way of being is deeply antithetical to the radi-
cally individualized, disenchanted, disembodied cogito, on which human-
ist ideals of rationality are founded. Indigenous spirituality, then, is more 
than an understanding that the world is made up of spiritual elements, and 
it goes beyond the epistemological implications that this has for making 
knowledge about the world. Indigenous people’s spiritual connections 
expand the ethic and purpose of their knowledge making so that these 
become epistemic endeavors with the world and for it. Accounts of indig-


































rationality’s cousin. We are not proposing a gnostic, romanticized oneness 
with nature, constructed from the desires of the Western subject (Said 
2003). Rather, the notion of the spiritual in indigenous knowledges must 
be taken as a rigorous epistemological principle. Believing knowledge to be 
rooted in the cycles of nature and the material parameters of a particular 
location will result in a historical sense different from the march of the 
Geist. Although the German word means “Spirit” in Hegel’s use of it to 
describe universal claims of a general consciousness discovered through 
“strictly rational procedures” (Solomon 1970, 646), Geist is incompatible 
with localized, embodied spiritualities characterizing indigenous ways of 
knowing. Perhaps more significantly, in locating the progression of history 
purely in the logical realm, the dialectic method obscures the historical 
realities of power and subjugation.3 Colonial knowledges did not achieve 
their dominance through logical sublation, but through political violence. 
By insisting on knowledge as rooted in the realities of place, indigenous 
epistemologies cannot be this forgetful.
Emphasis on ontological space as the site of indigenous knowledges 
explains why we retain the term indigenous, which has been critiqued as a 
colonial tactic to miniaturize subjugated knowledges so as to establish the 
superiority of the colonizer’s own knowledges in scope and therefore author-
ity. These and other normative associations linked with the term indigenous 
knowledge may suggest a preference for the term endogenous knowledge 
instead (Crossman and Devisch 2002), but we retain indigenous precisely 
because it foregrounds the unequal political conditions in which indigenous 
knowledges have to function. We wish to maintain the urgency of claims 
for epistemological justice. The relational model we propose is profoundly 
different from the Enlightenment understanding of rationality as a purely 
ideal, unembodied feature of existence, abstract and universal. Nonetheless, 
we acknowledge that trends in twentieth-century Western philosophy, spe-
cifically phenomenology and hermeneutics, are attentive to the embodied 
experience and the shaping importance of cultural histories in knowledge; 
similarly, sociocultural perspectives in the human sciences have explored 
learning and other aspects of social life as being a cultural activity situated 
by shared values, norms, and practices within a community. However, we 
maintain that the dialectical logic fundamental to so much of post-Enlight-
enment thought predisposes Western theoretical discourses, even those 
attempting to critique Western hegemony from within, to explore, encircle, 
and absorb other knowledges—in other words, to sublate them (see, e.g., 
Allen 2015). Such distortion of other knowledge traditions necessarily occurs 
in the moment of translation, when epistemes and languages encounter and 
try to understand each other; however, the epistemic attitude established 
by humanist rationality exceeds such necessary moves. The implications 
of this point can be made clearer by engaging with a recent development in 
Western thinking, one that at first glance seems to share the commitment of 
indigenous knowledges to relationality. This is posthumanism. The assump-


















































dialectical move that results in sublation and the appropriation and negation 
of other voices. In contrast, we argue that the commitment of indigenous 
epistemologies to ontological space produces a relational understanding of 
how different epistemes interact.
relational as Trialectic
Before demonstrating our reservations about the decolonizing potential 
offered by epistemological alternatives of posthumanism, we wish to clarify 
that our intention is not to address all knowledge traditions, including coun-
tertraditions; rather, our focus is on what we call the hegemonic Western 
knowledge tradition, characterized by post-Enlightenment thought, and the 
role that indigenous knowledges can play in decolonizing it. As should be 
clear, we identify the dialectical logic as a fundamental element of it and its 
construction of itself as superior, thereby making it the target of our proposed 
decolonization through indigenous knowledges. In what follows, we are sug-
gesting that, while posthumanism may have similar intentions, it may fall 
short, for the reasons offered below.
By posthumanist we understand, along with Gert Biesta (2006) and 
Cary Wolfe (2010), that a core element of this concept is its critique of the 
primacy of “the ‘I’ that has made modernity and colonialism possible” 
(Murris 2017, 458). We refer here to posthumanism’s aims of reimagining 
what it means to be human in light of Western colonial, modernist, and 
humanist perceptions, which have subalterned some people and nonhuman 
others. These perspectives tend to create binary oppositional categories, such 
as those of human and nonhuman, nature and culture, living and nonliving. 
These perceptions are further premised on universalist assumptions, which 
often ignore the role of power relations in their othering tendencies, as we 
intimated above in our discussion of Western knowledges. The notion of 
human is neither universal nor neutral, but “a normative category that 
indexes access to privileges and entitlements. Appeals to the ‘human’ are 
always discriminatory: they create structural distinctions and inequalities 
among different categories of humans, let alone between humans and non-
humans” (Braidotti 2019, 35). Therefore, posthumanist positions tend to 
define people as situated and acting from within relationships, as when a 
posthuman subject is described as “embedded, embodied and yet flowing in 
a web of relations with human and non-human others” (Braidotti 2019, 34). 
These positions are similar to the relational and spiritual ontological and 
axiological assumptions of indigenous knowledges discussed above:
Many indigenous worldviews are based upon an animistic 
philosophy that attests that the human entity is but one clan 
group within its relational family. [Vine] Deloria [1999] argues 
that a relational worldview, from a tribal perspective, is one 
that assumes relationships between all life forms that exist 


































We argue, however, that moving too quickly to equate the relationality pro-
posed in posthumanist arguments with that of indigenous knowledges elides 
the duty of fully recognizing the ontological status and moral authority of 
indigenous epistemes.
This point is necessary to emphasize because similarities between 
claims made by certain postmodernisms and decolonial positions have 
been hailed as positive, providing a pragmatic way forward out of the 
impasses of local decolonial struggles that can distract from wider global 
ecological concerns. Achille Joseph Mbembe, for example, argues that 
decolonial struggles remain in the rational humanist space; the colonized 
subject fighting oppression is constructed as an autonomous subject acting 
against an objective background. For him, the “dreams of mastery” (2016, 
42) so central to the decolonial impulse cannot be sustained because they 
replicate the terms established by colonization. He argues for a move 
beyond the colonial/decolonial binary by considering the nature of the 
human itself and the possibility of the posthuman. He follows the trace 
proposed by Frantz Fanon, that if a government is to liberate genuinely, 
it requires not only various social and economic programs, but, in fact, 
“a concept of man, a concept about the future of mankind” (1961, 143). 
Mbembe goes beyond the nationalistic sentiment in Fanon to the global, 
arguing that we must think of humanity not “from the perspective of its 
mastery of the Creation as we used to, but from the perspective of its fini-
tude and its possible extinction” (2016, 42). Thus, we must “rethink the 
human” (Mbembe 2016, 42). Mbembe posits that the language of decolo-
nization within the global colonial matrix is perhaps too archaic, inherited 
“from an entirely different age and epoch” (2016, 32). For him, the term had 
force in the work of, for example, Fanon (1961) and Ngugi wa Thiongo’o 
(1986), but he now wonders whether this particular concept, in the sense 
it was used then, is even suitable for the “complexly mutating entity” of 
coloniality we are fighting now (2016, 32).
We agree this is a pragmatic response, but we are cautious in too 
quickly abandoning the language of decolonization and taking on that of 
posthumanism instead. As Zembylas warns, the agendas of posthuman-
ism and decolonization do not always align, and significant tensions occur 
between these approaches. Both may involve rejecting the modern “I,” but 
the posthumanist focus on anthropocentricism and human exceptionality of 
this “I” as the targets of its critiques may issue in “new universalisms in the 
form of undifferentiated, ahistorical subjects by obscuring the geo-historical 
embeddedness of knowledge; by conflating being and our knowledge of it; 
and by underestimating the depoliticizing effect of distributing responsibility 
to assemblages of human and non-humans” (2018, 264). In similar although 
less nuanced terms, Artwell Nhemachena (2018) rejects posthumanism as 
cannibalistic of African humanity in that it seeks to erase the distinction 
between African people and animals through a colonial-styled decentering 
and deconstruction of African human essence. Nhemachemba’s argumenta-


















































the modern colonial subject, does not yet appreciate indigenous (including 
African indigenous) identities and ways of being (human) in the world.
One error posthumanisms can fall into, as Zoe Todd explains (2016), is 
that what is presented in academia as the theories and concepts of Western 
scholars can often be found in knowledges long held by indigenous people. 
Todd uses the example of a talk given by Bruno Latour in February 2013 as 
part of the University of Edinburgh’s Gifford Lectures on Natural Theology 
(Latour 2017). She describes how Latour develops a complex account of 
climate change as a matter of “common cosmological concern” without 
referencing any indigenous thinkers “for their millennia of engagement with 
sentient environments, with cosmologies that enmesh people into complex 
relationships between themselves and all relations, and with climates and 
atmospheres as important points of organization and action” (2016, 6–7). 
To illustrate, she gives an account of the concept of sila. As she explains, 
sila is an Inuit word that has come to mean “climate” to non-Inuit, but it is 
also, according to Rachel Qitsualik (1998), “the breathe [sic] that circulates 
into and out of every living thing” (quoted in Todd 2016, 5). Todd adds that 
sila links the environment to knowledge (2016, 5). The complexity of this 
concept lies in the way it is perceived as a common force in the air animat-
ing animal life and meteorological and other phenomena, prompting Todd 
to suggest that “it is bound with life, with climate, with knowing, and with 
the very existence of being(s)” (2016, 5). But it is the absence of this word or 
reference to the intellectual heritage of indigenous thinkers and activists in 
a talk on climate awareness by Latour that prompts the thought that when 
academics “start cherry-picking parts of Indigenous thoughts that appeal to 
them without engaging directly in (or unambiguously acknowledging) the 
political situation, legal orders and relationality of both Indigenous people 
and scholars, we immediately become complicit in colonial violence” (Todd 
2016, 18). The risk of forgetting the political is what Mbembe falls into, argu-
ably, by moving too swiftly into the posthumanist framework.
Todd’s example illustrates how coloniality of thought still functions 
via the movement toward sublation—an epistemological process of history-
making and knowledge-making that must homogenize and synthesize the 
dialectic through the movement of reason itself. Indigenous knowledges, if 
conceived of solely in dialectical relationship with Western knowledge, are 
placed in a dangerous and vulnerable position, where it is likely that in time 
they will be appropriated, absorbed, and dissolved into globalizing neoco-
lonial culture. The need for epistemological decolonization can disappear 
behind more obviously immediate struggles for institutional and economic 
justice. We do not forget that, as Sefa Dei points out, colonialism is alive in 
the denial of indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and self-autonomy, the dispos-
session of lands, the displacement of peoples, and the denial of people’s basic 
humanity, as well as imperialistic projects that continue to design other 
people’s futures (2016, 2). But we argue that decolonization is incomplete 
without epistemological justice, as illustrated by the example of a decolonial 


































(2012), who cite the conflict between the indigenous people whose ancestral 
lands form part of the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park 
(TIPNIS) and international, state, and commercial farming interests support-
ing construction of a highway through the ancestral lands as illustrating 
an ongoing disregard for indigenous peoples’ identity and rights. In 2011, 
approximately one thousand indigenous people from the lowlands took part 
in a two-month, 250-mile march, now known as the TIPNIS March, to the 
presidential palace to deliver sixteen demands for legal and political recogni-
tion and protection. This appeal was largely successful, with the president 
signing a law that forbade construction of the road through any portion of 
the TIPNIS area and classified the park as untouchable for development 
projects (Brysk and Bennett 2012, 123). However, while Brysk and Bennett 
may celebrate the indigenous people’s appropriation of globalized discourses, 
politics, and languages to halt the construction of the road, this progress in 
indigenous people’s strategies against marginalization, we contend, signals 
the failure to recognize on their own terms the moral authority of indigenous 
worldviews. Such a failure effectually produces indigenous knowledge as a 
racialized category, produced from and owing its being to Western discourses 
and desires. It is of this version of indigenous knowledge that Lesley Green 
speaks of when she finds a “rich irony in that the concept of ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ is itself a hybrid creation which emerges in counterpoint to 
globalization, and draws from a romantic Western notion of culture as static 
and unbounded” (2008, 113). Jeff Corntassel and Cheryl Bryce seem to be in 
agreement with her when they suggest “moving away from the performativ-
ity of a rights discourse geared toward state affirmation and approval toward 
a daily existence conditioned by place-based cultural practices” (2012, 153). 
We insist, therefore, that it is necessary to frame the struggles of indigenous 
people, and colonized peoples more broadly, within their own ontological 
and axiological frames of reference, for two reasons. First is the conceptual 
richness of indigenous knowledges arising from alternative ontological 
and axiological preconceptions about knowledge and knowing, which offer 
underexplored—in academia—avenues for thinking through the ongoing 
problem of coloniality. Second, it is necessary to give subjugated knowledges 
equal status in terms of political agency and explanatory power as a means 
of taking an unambiguous step toward undoing their silencing by global 
coloniality. Given the persisting effects of colonialism as a subjugating force, 
we have therefore chosen the anticolonials as the framework from which to 
approach decolonization.
An anticolonial framework “theorizes colonial and de-colonial rela-
tions and the implications of imperial structures on the processes of knowl-
edge production and validation” (Sefa Dei 2002, 43) by giving priority to 
indigenous peoples’ perceptions and ways of knowing and mobilizing these 
for interrogating their marginalization. By resisting that which the colonial 
ideology brought into being, such as the current academic interpretation of 
justified true belief, and historically situating research within the power 


















































anticolonialism seeks to acknowledge locally produced knowledges (Sefa 
Dei 2000, 2002). Affirming local knowledge in this way counteracts the 
hegemonic tendencies of the dominating epistemological traditions and 
formal knowledge-producing institutions initiated by colonial rulers. The 
anticolonial approach directs its focus on “(a) processes of knowledge pro-
duction, interrogation, validation, and dissemination; (b) the understanding 
of Indigeneity as both a process and identity; and (c) the pursuit of agency, 
resistance, and subjective politics” (Sefa Dei 2016, 1). By tracing back 
to colonialism the inequalities complicit in knowledge production, the 
anticolonial framework affirms our definition of indigenous knowledges 
as arising out of a dialectical relationship within that context, recognizing 
their present condition in a manner that brings continuity to the struggles 
of the holders of those knowledges. Given the related relational and spiri-
tual components to local knowledge conveyed by the defining aspects we 
identify above, it can be argued that by prioritizing local knowledge, the 
anticolonial approach makes these elements central to its theorizing of 
decolonized knowledge production. In effect then, the first two senses of 
relationality are operating here.
Sefa Dei (2012) works to instantiate the change he calls for by apply-
ing the concept of suahunu, drawn from his Ghanaian Akan heritage, to 
the anticolonial approach. He explains that suahunu means something like 
“learning and coming to know and to act responsibly within communities” 
(2012, 841)—in other words, the kind of knowing with and for discussed 
above. Sefa Dei speaks eloquently about the epistemological principles of 
Akan culture, in which body/mind, spirit (personality and integrity), and 
soul (inner self or environment) work together to help the self “come to 
know and make sense of the world in relation to others” (2012, 830). This 
understanding of knowing is clearly a “paradigm shift” away from the 
“privileging of Cartesian reasoning and ‘intellect’ over body” (830). Sefa Dei 
then expands, theorizing suahunu as a trialectic space within which trans-
formative engagement is facilitated through multiple epistemic sites, which 
privilege interconnections at levels within and among the self, society, and 
nature. Thus, ontological space is central to trialectic space, which Sefa Dei 
calls a site for “multicentric ways of knowing” involving dialogue between 
“Indigenous knowledge and other bodies of knowledge, including main-
stream or Western science knowledges,” seeing emotions, intuitions, and 
spirituality as “legitimate knowings” as well as rational deductions (2012, 
836). The multidimensionality of trialectic space is usefully outlined by Jadie 
McDonnell: “As the spirit is embodied and manifests in multiple sites of 
knowledge (the social, cultural, environmental, economic, and political)[,] it 
is not separate from knowledge, production, worldviews, morals, values, and 
beliefs but is also interconnected and intertwined with all aspects of life” 
(2014, 102). Within trialectic space, these body-mind-soul or culture-society-
nature relationships offer opportunities for negotiating indigenous priorities 
in a space that is “transgressive and counterhegemonic to institutionalized 


































Sefa Dei’s anticolonialism, are founded on respect: “acknowledging multiple 
knowledges is about the humility of knowing, eschewing arrogance” (2012, 
836). The work of decolonization is “not to undo Western ways of know-
ing, but rather to undo the hold they have on what is considered legitimate 
knowledge” (2012, 825).
Sefa Dei’s notion of epistemological humility encapsulates the third 
sense in which indigenous knowledges are fundamentally relational. As 
the root of the word trialectic suggests, Sefa Dei’s anticolonial framework 
transcends dialectical logic and the dynamic of sublation that haunts it. 
By insisting on knowledge as embedded in local histories, experiences, and 
spiritualities, as multifaceted and multicentric, anticolonial approaches 
theorize epistemes existing in dynamic networked relationships that can 
never collapse into a single universal. Sefa Dei’s notion of multicen-
tric knowledge and trialectic space resembles Walter Mignolo’s concep-
tion of the pluriversal (2002). As Zembylas explains, pluriversality would 
acknowledge diverse pathways for realizing the practicalities of knowledge 
production (2018).
Concluding Remarks
In this article we have demonstrated the potential of indigenous knowl-
edges, and particularly their fundamental relationality, as tools for exposing 
and undermining what we have identified as the ongoing colonial historical 
and logical processes perpetuating Western epistemic domination. Thus, 
the purpose of identifying “a particular species of contact with a domi-
nant Western society” is to draw attention to a historical reality that has 
resulted from human action (Breidlid and Botha 2015, 322). The implication 
is that if this reality is the product of human action, then transforming it 
is also a historical task for humans. That is to say, indigenous knowledges 
have been constructed as the subjugated Other to hegemonic Western 
knowledges by historical human action, and therefore the possibility of 
creating alternative realities in this regard exists. It is for this reason that 
Sefa Dei and Alirezza Asgharzadeh view indigenous knowledges as offer-
ing “a social and political corrective” (2001, 298). Our argument here is 
that the transformative potential within the dialectic relations between 
indigenous and Western knowledges can be harnessed for the purpose of 
decolonization until the relationship between them is no longer dialectical 
between hegemony and subjugated, but relational. In this way, we have 
sought to address the persistent historical logic of Western rationalization, 
which tends to subsume attempts at countering the dominant knowledge 
tradition.
Our conceptual argument has focused on one element of the anticolo-
nial project, “processes of knowledge production, interrogation, validation, 
and dissemination,” but ultimately this cannot be separated from the other 


















































. . . the pursuit of agency, resistance, and subjective politics” (Sefa Dei 2016, 
1). A percipient interpretation of the relational dimensions of indigenous 
knowledges affords the opportunity not only to dismantle the subtler work-
ings of colonial relations, but also to reposition them so they illuminate the 
counterhegemonic spaces we wish to create.
NOTEs
1. By epistemic decolonization, we mean far more than simply africanizing curriculum content. 
Instead, we refer to undoing that strand of the “colonial power matrix” that seeks to control 
knowledge and subjectivity by establishing colonial regimes of knowledge as the only legiti-
mate knowledge and rearticulating non-western subjectivity as “inferior and constituted by 
a series of ‘deficits’ and a catalogue of ‘lacks’” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012).
2. and is now sustained by the neocolonial dynamics inherent in globalization, the heir of 
colonization; it is only at the borders of colonial space that “the economic conditions created 
by globalization [have] contributed to the rise of ‘barbarian theorizing’” (Mignolo 2012, 308).
3. Certainly, in the western tradition, hegel’s idealism has not gone uncontested. Marx inverted 
hegel’s teleological approach to history, grounding it in material reality. subsequent genera-
tions of frankfurt school and Critical Theory theorists have grappled with and revised Marxist 
claims, developing notions such as praxis and emancipation from them, with reference to 
contemporary society (Blake and Masschelein 2002).
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